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Abstract
Spacetime functionalism is the view that spacetime is a functional
structure implemented by a more fundamental ontology. Lam and
Wu¨thrich have recently argued that spacetime functionalism helps to
solve the epistemological problem of empirical coherence in quantum
gravity and suggested that it also (dis)solves the hard problem of
spacetime, namely the problem of offering a picture consistent with the
emergence of spacetime from a non-spatio-temporal structure. First,
I will deny that spacetime functionalism solves the hard problem by
showing that it comes in various species, each entailing a different
attitude towards, or answer to, the hard problem. Second, I will argue
that the existence of an explanatory gap, which grounds the hard
problem, has not been correctly taken into account in the literature.
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1 Introduction
Several approaches in physics entail that space (or spacetime) emerges
from a structure in which interesting features of space and time are
missing. This is the case in many approaches to quantum gravity:
for instance in loop quantum gravity and string theory1, but also
in a particular approach to quantum mechanics: configuration space
realism.2 A general issue is then to understand the nature of this re-
lation of emergence and to determine what sort of ontological picture
follows from spacetime emergence. Lam and Wu¨thrich (2018) have
suggested—in the context of quantum gravity—to identify this rela-
tion of emergence3 with a relation of functional realisation—thereby
drawing inspiration from the philosophy of mind where functional re-
alisation4 is a popular way to analyse the relation obtaining between
physical states and mental states.5
In this paper, I examine how exactly functional realisation may
help us understand situations of spacetime emergence. More precisely,
I examine whether the view that spacetime is a collection of functional
roles may help (dis)solve several problems associated with spacetime
emergence. Indeed, although Lam and Wu¨thrich (2018) focus on a
particular epistemological issue that I will discuss later—namely, the
problem of empirical coherence (introduced by Huggett and Wu¨thrich,
2013): How are we going to justify a theory which threatens its own
1For a review, see e.g. Huggett and Wu¨thrich (2013), Crowther (2016) and Le Bihan
and Linnemann (2019).
2See e.g. Monton (2002, 2006), Maudlin (2007) and Ney and Albert (2013).
3Note that the expression “emergence”, in this context, should be understood as a
neutral expression, a placeholder for a problem, which does not entail any particular in-
terpretation of the nature of the relation. This point deserves our attention since the
term has a different meaning in philosophy and general philosophy of science on the one
hand, and in philosophy of physics and physics on the other hand—the separation may
be drawn differently, but what matters here is that there exists two different termino-
logical traditions. In the field of general philosophy, the relation of emergence is a very
specific notion associated with highly specific features: emergent entities are regarded as
not owned by the system from which they emerge, being both novel in some sense, and
ontologically dependent upon the entities they are emerging from, thereby going against
reductionism. In contrast, in physics and philosophy of physics proper, the relation is
generally regarded as a generic one that still has to be interpreted further and is even
consistent with reductionism (see Butterfield, 2011 and Crowther, 2018).
4Spacetime functionalism also designates an approach defended by Knox (2013, 2014,
2017) according to which the concept of spacetime within a physical theory, and in partic-
ular general relativity, should be analysed as a particular functional role in the theory. I
will not say anything about this view and how it relates to Lam’s and Wu¨thrich’s account.
5Other candidate relations for this spacetime “emergence” are philosophical emergence,
brute constitution, grounding and mereological composition (see Le Bihan 2018b).
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evidence which, arguably, is located in space and time?—they take
their functionalist strategy to have a broader application, when they
write:
We will investigate to what extent a functionalist per-
spective allows us to bridge the metaphysical gap between
the structures postulated by these theories and smooth
classical spacetime as we find it in GR. (Lam and Wu¨thrich,
2018, p.40, my emphasis)
To put it differently, according to Lam and Wu¨thrich (LW from
now on) functionalism might, in principle, do more than just solve
the problem of empirical coherence by also providing an answer to
the more general philosophical issue of accounting for the “metaphys-
ical gap” obtaining between a spatio-temporal theory (General Rel-
ativity, GR for short) and a non-spatio-temporal theory—a problem
that amounts, in the context of Quantum Gravity, to asking, first,
whether GR spacetime does (not fundamentally) exist or, on the con-
trary, does not exist and, second, about how we may connect a more
fundamental non-spatio-temporal structure with a less fundamental
spatio-temporal structure. However, they also write:
Whether one ultimately wishes to be a realist or an
eliminativist about spacetime is orthogonal to our concern
here. (Lam and Wu¨thrich, 2018, p.40)
and,
[F]rom a functionalist point of view, nothing remains
beyond showing how the fundamental degrees of freedom
can collectively behave such that they appear spatiotem-
poral at macroscopic scales in all relevant and empirically
testable ways. This turns out to be a hard task in quantum
gravity. Functionalism can be seen as the assertion that
once this task is completed, no unfinished business lingers
on. (Lam and Wu¨thrich, 2018, p.44, my emphasis)
There is a tension in the conjunction of these three quotes—one
which may be addressed in various ways. Indeed, those assertions may
be read as contradictory answers to the question suggested by the first
quote: Is functionalism able to bridge the metaphysical gap (a ques-
tion that I will call the “hard problem of spacetime emergence” for
reasons that I will explain later)? The second quote suggests that it
cannot do so since spacetime functionalism is orthogonal to the hard
problem. The third quote suggests a positive answer to the question,
at least if we take the dissolution of an issue to count as a particular
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solution to this issue: Functionalism is the last word regarding space-
time emergence, and solves everything there is to solve. There would
be nothing left to explain and, as a result, there would not be any
hard problem. In other words, we observe a shift from the claim that
functionalism is orthogonal to the hard problem of spacetime (claim
1. from now on) to the claim that functionalism (dis)solves the hard
problem of spacetime (claim 2. hereafter).
However, and despite the tension between the three quotes, I share
some of the intuitions that I take to lie behind the formulation of those
two claims; and I believe that some claims in the vicinity of 1. and 2.
are correct. As a result, I will defend the three following—similar but
distinct—claims:
• 1*. functionalism may be regarded as a view orthogonal to the
hard problem of spacetime when subscribing to a particular sort
of functionalism,
• 2*. functionalism may be regarded as a particular solution to
the hard problem of spacetime when subscribing to a particular
sort of functionalism and,
• 2**. functionalism helps to solve some—but not all—problems
of spacetime emergence.
It should be clear at this point that the paper is not an attack or a
defense of LW’s paper but rather a clarification of what functionalism
can do for us when we face the most metaphysical issues arising in
scenarios of spacetime emergence. In section 2., I begin by introduc-
ing two possible cases of spacetime emergence—in string theory and
loop quantum gravity (section 2.1). I then offer a novel classification of
philosophical issues that may be raised when faced with the claim that
spacetime does not exist fundamentally by distinguishing four distinct
issues: the scientific problem, the problem of empirical coherence, the
ontological problem and the hard problem of spacetime (sections 2.2
and 2.3). In section 2.4, I discuss whether there actually is a hard
problem of spacetime by focusing on the concept of spacetime qualia
and argue that the concept has been dismissed too quickly in the liter-
ature. Arguably, strictly speaking there are no spacetime qualia since
there is no phenomenal what it is like to be spacetime. However,
there is a physical what it is like to be spacetime, which is embedded
through the relational structure of spacetime as (at least minimally)
described by General Relativity, that is regarded as being missing in
quantum gravity, thereby justifying drawing a comparison between the
difficulty of relating qualia with physical facts on the one hand, and
the difficulty to account for the transition from a non-spatio-temporal
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structure to GR spacetime on the other hand. I then turn to function-
alism in the philosophy of mind, distinguishing between four kinds of
functionalism about the mind, each relying on a different answer to
the hard problem of consciousness (section 3.1). In section 3.2, I show
that this classification applies similarly to spacetime emergence and
that it is also convenient in this context to distinguish between four
sorts of spacetime functionalism.6 Finally, I close by showing that
some kinds of spacetime functionalism solve—but are not orthogonal
to—the hard problem of spacetime whereas another kind of spacetime
functionalism is orthogonal to—but does not solve—the hard problem.
2 Spacetime Emergence
2.1 Two Examples of Spacetime Emergence
Spacetime is regarded as potentially emerging from, or being consti-
tuted by, a non-spatio-temporal structure in various approaches to
QG, to various degrees. At first glance, it may mean several things
depending on whether space, time or spacetime, comes under attack.
As Le Bihan and Linnemann (2019) argue, if one defines the existence
of a minimal spacetime as the existence of a local split between two
structures—“space” or “quasi-space” on the one hand, and “time” or
“quasi-time” on the other hand—then we find such a distinction im-
plemented in most approaches to quantum gravity, either with Lorentz
symmetries or through another diachronic principle. However, and as
suggested by the expression “quasi-space” and “quasi-time”, this is
not to say that no interesting features usually ascribed to space and
time are missing in quantum gravity. Let us have a look at the most
popular approaches to quantum gravity in order to get a sense of such
a disappearance: string theory and loop quantum gravity.7
In string theory, the 4D spacetime emerges, prima facie, from a
10D structure. According to a naive understanding there is no problem
of spacetime emergence in this context since the additional dimensions
are compactified: it is simply that we just fail to notice them when
we zoom out. But there are five different dual 10D string theories,
and models of these theories are empirically equivalent. Some of those
6Yates (forthcoming) already made interesting distinctions between various sorts of
spacetime functionalisms. However, I will not use his classification since it is not primarily
designed to address the hard problem of spacetime. Rather, I will start with the classi-
fication of functionalisms about the mind that I find the most promising to address the
hard problem and, then only, I will apply it to spacetime functionalism.
7For a more general review, cf. Huggett and Wu¨thrich (2013) and Le Bihan and
Linnemann (2019).
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models are related by T-duality and possess different compactification
radius. As a result, the network of dual theories has to be related to a
more fundamental M-theory, which still has to be found, and to GR.
Therefore, the classic story about the compactification of unobserved
dimensions does not explain away the emergence of GR spacetime.
And importantly for our purpose, as demonstrated by Huggett (2017)
the target spaces on which the strings live cannot be identified with
GR spacetime. What, then, is the many-to-one relation between dual
theories and GR spacetime?
A lively discussion is still on about how we should interpret dual-
ity, in particular in the context of string theory.8 I will not get into
the details of this discussion but merely note that if we remain at the
level of the many-to-one relation obtaining between target spaces and
GR spacetime, we have a problem of spacetime emergence. And, if
we subscribe further to a particular philosophical (and popular) in-
terpretation of this many-to-one scheme, namely the common core
approach, then what is real is the common core of the dual theories.
Since these duals do not share much structure (they can vary in mere-
ological structure, dimensional compactification radius), this common
core structure, or “quasi-space”, if borne out, would have to substan-
tially differ from space.9
In loop quantum gravity (LQG hereafter), what there is instead of
spacetime are entities (or a structure) described by “spin networks” or
“‘spinfoam”—namely, collections of nodes and relations (the loops) be-
tween these nodes (see Rovelli 2004 and Rovelli and Vidotto 2014; for a
summary aimed at philosophers cf. Huggett and Wu¨thrich 2013, 279-
280). Spin foams describe discretely valued volumes and areas leading
to a question about the nature of the relation obtaining between these
discrete structures and the continuous GR structure. Importantly
for our purpose, the organisation of the LQG structure may not cor-
respond systematically to the spatio-temporal ordering of events, as
described by GR: indeed, in some models of LQG, some relations
of adjacency in the LQG structure correspond to relations of large
spatio-temporal distances in the GR structure. See e.g. Markopoulou
8See e.g. Rickles (2011, 2013, 2017); Teh (2013); Matsubara (2013); Read and Møller-
Nielsen (2018); Le Bihan and Read (2018); Weatherall (2019) and Butterfield (forthcom-
ing).
9Other philosophical interpretations of duality might avoid saying goodbye to space-
time, for instance by adopting the nihilist view that none of the dual theories offer accurate
enough descriptions of the world—thereby entailing that duality has no metaphysical sig-
nificance (see Le Bihan and Read 2018). This is not the place to examine the consequence
of each philosophical interpretation of duality on the problem of spacetime emergence.
What matters for my purpose is that at least some, prima facie plausible, interpretations
of duality entail that space is missing.
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and Smolin (2007) and Huggett and Wu¨thrich (2013, 279-280) for a
philosophical discussion.
When we face such scenarios of spacetime emergence, we may dis-
tinguish between at least four distinct issues. Let us start with the
most famous problem of spacetime emergence in the philosophical lit-
erature: namely, the problem of empirical coherence.
2.2 The Problem of Empirical Coherence
Problems of empirical coherence arise when a scientific theory puts at
risk the very existence of its empirical evidence. Problems of this sort
have been said to arise in various contexts. It has been discussed by
Barrett (who introduced the term) in the context of quantum mechan-
ics10 and then in the context of a specific interpretation of quantum
mechanics (configuration space realism or wave function realism).11
But, within the scope of this essay, we only need to concern ourselves
with a particular version of the issue presented later on by Huggett
and Wu¨thrich (2013) in the context of quantum gravity. Assuming
that spacetime emerges from a non-spatio-temporal structure, how
are we going to make sense of the possibility of making measurements
somewhere and somewhen? Can we rely on measurements occurring
in space and time to justify the claim that space and time do not
exist?
Several things can be said in response to this point. For instance,
one may argue that spacetime does not need to be fundamentally real
but only derivatively real in order to account for the empirical co-
herence of any theory denying the fundamental existence of spacetime
(Wu¨thrich, 2017, 298). Or, alternatively, one might point out that the
physicality of the physical world flows down in a straightforward way
from the mathematical derivation of the derivative theory—a theory
that can be safely related to the empirical realm. At this stage, one
may already wonder whether we really need the fundamental existence
of rods and clocks or of any other experimental device, or whether the
derivative existence of these devices is all we need to rule out issues of
empirical coherence. Indeed, perhaps we only need experimental de-
vices, namely chunks of reality that appear, in practice,12 as entities
located in space and time. We here have a first glimpse of another—
more metaphysical—problem, the ontological problem: what is the
10Barrett (1996).
11See e.g. Monton (2002, 2006), Maudlin (2007) and Albert (2015).
12It is tempting to use the word “effective” in this context. However, the term is
ambiguous in that it is sometimes associated in the literature with a particular domain of
energy, and sometimes with the concept of approximation.
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ontological status of spacetime?13 This issue relates closely to the
problem of empirical coherence; however, as we shall see, it should
not be identified with it.
But before turning to the ontological problem, a final word about
the problem of empirical coherence is in order. As acknowledged by
Christian Wu¨thrich (private discussions), the problem of empirical co-
herence for quantum theories of gravity was mounted by Nick Huggett
and Christian Wu¨thrich, who were opened to the idea that spacetime
might not exist, fundamentally, in order to make sense of, and ar-
gue against, the claim made by other more skeptic philosophers that
the view does not even make sense. Unfortunately, the problem of
empirical coherence only achieved partially this goal, as we shall see,
since it does not answer to all of the intuitions detractors of emerging
spacetime rely on.
2.3 Easy and Hard Problems
The comparison between the problem of spacetime emergence in the
philosophy of quantum gravity and the hard problem of consciousness
in the philosophy of mind has been introduced by Le Bihan (2018a,b)
and Le Bihan and Linnemann (2019). Let us have a look at the
situation in the philosophy of mind in order to lay the ground for a
discussion of spacetime emergence. One may describe the field of the
philosophy of mind as focusing primarily on offering a convincing story
about the relation obtaining between mental and physical entities,
being granted that mental entities seem, prima facie, to display at
least two specific sorts of features—two marks of the mental—at odds
with features of the physical world. A first mark of the mental is
intentionality : some mental states, perhaps all of them, are directed
towards an object, that may or not correspond to a physical entity.
A second mark of the mental is the presence of qualitative features:
mental states have a “what it is like to experience this particular
state”, namely qualia. Experiential states, in particular, display those
qualitative aspects. Any attempt at naturalising the mind—namely
at explaining these apparent distinct features in the background of
a physicalist ontology—must take care of these two aspects. The
existence of these two aspects does not necessarily mean that there
are two sorts of mental states, namely states associated with propo-
sitional attitudes that would exhibit intentionality on the one hand,
and experiential states associated to qualitative aspects; it might be
13Note that this expression might also be used to refer to another related problem,
namely the problem of understanding the ontological status of non-spatio-temporal entities
(see Lam and Wu¨thrich 2018).
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that propositional states are associated with qualitative features, and
experiential states with an intentional component (cf. Horgan and
Tienson, 2002). What matters here is that philosophers of mind must
meet two distinct challenges: naturalising intentionality and naturalis-
ing qualia. The problem of intentionality, in particular, has prompted
philosophers of mind to ground the intentionality of the mind in “phys-
ical functions”, for instance in biological functions as with the teleose-
mantic approach (cf. Macdonald and Papineau, 2006), or in states of
physical systems similar to computers with the computational theory
of thought (see e.g. Rey, 1997). Therefore, functionalism turned out
to be handy for dealing with the task of naturalising intentionality.14
When it comes to the naturalisation of qualia, functionalism is not
that helpful though: qualia seem to resist any functional treatment
since their very essence is to exhibit a qualitative feature that resists to
any reduction to features of a physical system. As a result, Chalmers
(1995) distinguished between the hard problem of consciousness—
which amounts to explaining the phenomenological specificity of qualia
in a physicalist ontology or, to put it differently, to deal with the appar-
ent impossibility to naturalise qualia because of the explanatory gap
between the mental and the physical (see Levine 1983)—and other
“easy” issues such as the scientific problem and the problem of inten-
tionality. Those issues are easy in the sense that they seem tractable
and tightly related to empirical issues.
Following Le Bihan (2018a,b) and Le Bihan and Linnemann (2019),
one may apply this distinction between easy problems and a hard
problem to the context of spacetime emergence. In fact, it is useful
to distinguish between four distinct issues: the problem of empirical
coherence that I have introduced in the previous sub-section and three
other issues, the scientific problem, the hard problem, the ontological
problem.
First, we must actually derive General Relativity from Quantum
Gravity—using mathematical tools and bridge principles between the
primitive notions of the two theories. Let us call this: “the scien-
tific problem”. It is the analogue of another scientific problem in the
context of the philosophy of mind, namely the finding of systematic
correlations between physical states and mental states.15 The scien-
14Mental states are sometimes said to have a third defining feature in being owned
by a particular entity, namely a self. The problem of subjectivity is more specific since
not everyone agrees that there actually is a sense of the self, a qualitative self with a
phenomenological specificity similar to qualia, that should be explained. See for instance
Benovsky (2018).
15This is not to say that the two scientific problems are identical. In the context of
quantum gravity, the problem is to find a derivation of one theory from the other; in the
9
tific problem is an easy problem in the sense that it may be achieved in
principle in such a way that, as soon as it will be done, nothing will be
left to achieve. Of course, this denomination should not fool ourselves:
this issue is one of the most difficult problems ever met by theoretical
physicists since it requires formulating a theory of quantum gravity
and relating it to GR.
Second, the hard problem of spacetime is very similar to the hard
problem of consciousness. The hard problem of spacetime is to ac-
count for the apparent explanatory gap, or conceptual discrepancy,
between the primitive notions of the spatio-temporal and the non-
spatio-temporal theories. Indeed, the cognitive dissonance is defea-
sible evidence for the existence of an explanatory gap—and so, con-
clusive evidence that there is a concrete issue to be addressed here,
just as with the analogous case in the philosophy of mind. We will
see above a potential example of an explanatory gap with disordered
locality in loop quantum gravity, as the specifics of the explanatory
gap will vary from one approach to quantum gravity to another.
Third, it relates closely to the ontological problem—namely, under-
standing whether spacetime is real or not—since particular answers to
the ontological problem lead to various answers to the hard problem.
For instance, eliminativism about spacetime, the view that spacetime
does not exist—one answer to the ontological problem—deflates the
hard problem of spacetime ontologically speaking, but not the hard
problem broadly conceived since the eliminativist still has to provide
an explanation for the success of GR, and for our phenomenology of
a world in which things obtain in space and time (after all, space
and time seem to exist at least at the macroscopic scale). Realism
about spacetime—another answer to the ontological problem—entails
a different approach to the hard problem of spacetime differently, by
enquiring about the relation obtaining between the more fundamental
non-spatio-temporal structure described by QG and the less funda-
mental spatio-temporal structure of GR—two real structures. There-
fore, although one may formally distinguish between the hard problem
and the ontological problem, the two issues are deeply entrenched.
Let us already note that one might argue that, independently of
whether there is a hard problem of consciousness, there is no hard
problem of spacetime emergence. We will examine this claim in the
next sub-section; what matters at this stage is that there is prima fa-
cie an issue that needs to be addressed, even if its solution amounts to
claiming that there is no equivalent of the hard problem of conscious-
ness in the case of spacetime emergence. Indeed, as a matter of fact,
the claim that spacetime emerges from a non-spatio-temporal struc-
context of the philosophy of mind, the aim is to map mental states upon physical states.
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ture has triggered skeptic reactions: spacetime must be fundamentally
real, it has been claimed, otherwise we would end up with a gap be-
tween the world as we experience it and theorize it through GR on the
one hand and its fundamental structure on the other hand. Something
has to be said in response to those reactions, if only to explain why
they are not accurate or why and how they could be dismissed.
Finally, let us ask whether the problem of empirical coherence
should be regarded as an easy or hard problem. Unlike the easy
and hard problems of spacetime emergence, the problem of empirical
coherence does not arise from looking at the relation obtaining be-
tween two theories, but between a fundamental non-spatio-temporal
theory—or what is taken to be the most fundamental theory16—and
empirical evidence located in space and time. However, let us set aside
the fact that the problem of empirical coherence deals with the rela-
tion between a theory and its evidence rather than with the relation
obtaining between two theories. As far as I can see, the best analogue
of the problem of empirical coherence in the philosophy of quantum
gravity is the problem of intentionality in the philosophy of mind. In-
deed, first it is not entirely clear prima facie whether the problem of
empirical coherence is easy or hard, just like the problem of intention-
ality is not systematically categorised as being easy or hard. Second,
after closer examination, the problem of empirical coherence, when we
carefully distinguish it from the hard problem of spacetime emergence,
does not seem that difficult. The situation echoes what became to be
a standard view in the philosophy of mind: the naturalising of inten-
tional states is not that problematic as soon as we distinguish clearly
between the qualitative feature and the intentional feature of mental
states. Intentionality may be explained functionally without taking
position on how we should deal with qualia. Likewise in the philos-
ophy of quantum gravity, the problem of empirical coherence can be
given a functional treatment without subscribing to a particular view
on the reality of spacetime, or on the nature of the relationship space-
time holds with the QG structure that implements it (as we shall see
in section 3, the obvious candidate from a functionalist perspective—
the relation of functional realisation—is ambiguous as it may refer to
a purely linguistic entity, or to a more ontologically-loaded relation).
In brief, the construction of a problem of empirical coherence was
an important milestone in the general project of turning intuitions
against spacetime emergence into actual problems. But even if the
scientific problem and the problem of empirical coherence were to be
solved, we would still want to know about the ontological status of
spacetime (does it exist or not?) and how it relates with the more
16It might be that the quantum theory of gravity is not fundamental.
11
basal structure that implements it (what is this relation, can we make
sense of the conceptual dissonance arising from the comparing of the
two structures?). And if one wants to deny that there is an ontological
problem, along instrumentalist lines, one must at least explain what
is wrong with the hard problem, and the intuitions of some scholars17
that there is too much of a gap between the spatio-temporal and the
non-spatio-temporal, in such a way that the very notion of spacetime
emergence, according to them, is inconsistent. Therefore, the ontolog-
ical problem and the hard problem constitute another challenge that
should be met by friends of spacetime emergence. This challenge has
been neglected since philosophers have believed that the concept of
spacetime qualia does not make much sense, preventing them to actu-
ally engage with the hard problem. However, as we will see, although
the notion of “spacetime qualia” is certainly more dubious than the no-
tion of qualia in the philosophy of mind, there genuinely is a cognitive
dissonance between the spatio-temporal and the non-spatio-temporal
notions that must be addressed.
2.4 Addressing the Cognitive Dissonance
The very existence of a hard problem of spacetime relies on the idea
that one experiences a cognitive dissonance when considering a spatio-
temporal theory and a non-spatio-temporal theory, similar to the one
experienced when comparing the physical and the mental—a concep-
tual gap which triggers a need for explanation. The general agreement
among philosophers of physics seems to be that there is no equivalent
to the concept of qualia in the context of spacetime emergence and so,
that there is no important conceptual gap that should be taken care
of in the case of spacetime emergence. This is for instance the view
advocated by LW who follow Knox (2014) on this matter:
It is not clear [...] how much traction the “qualia” con-
cern really gets in the spacetime case as compared to the
philosophy of mind. As Knox (2014) puts it, “[w]here the
fan of qualia has introspection, the fan of the [spacetime]
container has only metaphor” (16). The nature and status
of the evidence in favour of qualia may be equivocal, but
the alleged ineliminable intrinsically spatiotemporal but in-
effable quality of a spacetime substance remains positively
elusive. What could remain of that quality once we have
accounted for all relevant spatiotemporal features such as
17For a discussion of this kind of worry in the context of canonical quantum gravity, see
Lam and Esfeld (2013).
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(relative) localisation as captured by the relative spatial
and temporal order, their metric valuations in spatial dis-
tances and temporal durations, and perhaps more? (Lam
and Wu¨thrich 2018, section 3)
First, I would like to note that LW do not dispute a problematic
simplification made by Knox (2014) in this quote in associating the
container metaphor with realism about spacetime (conditioning the
existence of spacetime qualia to the existence of substantial space-
time). Strictly speaking, the container metaphor should only be as-
sociated with one version of realism, namely substantivalism about
spacetime, the view that spacetime is a substance in which things take
place.18 But note that spacetime relationism, the view that space-
time is a network of relations, denies the relevance of this container
metaphor.19 Then, it is a further and distinct question whether such
a relationist view of spacetime should be categorised as a realist or an
anti-realist view about spacetime. In other words, one might be realist
about spacetime along a relationalist/structuralist approach (see e.g.
Bain, 2006, Esfeld and Lam, 2008, Le Bihan, 2016). The question of
whether relationism should be best thought of as a form of realism
or of anti-realism about spacetime might be regarded, at first glance,
as a purely terminological matter, at least to some extent. However,
when we look at radical cases of spacetime being missing in quantum
gravity, it becomes clear that the non-fundamental existence of space-
time does not amount to claiming that spacetime is nothing else than
spatio-temporal relations. Indeed, think for instance about disordered
locality in loop quantum gravity (Markopoulou and Smolin, 2007) that
I mentioned before: if borne out, such a view would entail that GR
spacetime, even if correctly described as a network of relations, does
not exist fundamentally because the fundamental network of relations
has a different structure. The problem with spacetime emergence is
that even an ontologically light spacetime—as described by relation-
ism and/or structuralism—might emerge from a non-spatio-temporal
distinct structure. What matters here is not to which ontological cat-
egory belong the two structures (relations, substances or something
else) but the fact that we have to deal with two structures.
Consequently, it should be clear that in the context of spacetime
emergence, one must distinguish carefully between spacetime relation-
ism and spacetime eliminativism—two views that reject the container
metaphor. As a result, the container metaphor should not be as-
18See e.g. Pooley (2013) for a presentation of those approaches.
19The relationist/substantivalist opposition relies on several differences, the relevance of
the container metaphor is just one of them, see e.g. Le Bihan (2016).
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sociated with spacetime realism, but only with a particular sort of
spacetime realism, namely spacetime substantivalism. This point is
important as it shows that spacetime realism is not necessarily tied
with the container metaphor mentioned by Knox (2014), and that
someone arguing that there is something strange in the transition
from the non-spatio-temporal to the spatio-temporal does not have,
as a matter of necessity, to be motivated by the container metaphor.
This is simply not what is at stake with the existence of an explanatory
gap between GR and QG, or with the possible existence of spacetime
qualia. For instance, in the particular case of disordered locality, the
notion of spacetime qualia that should be discussed has nothing to do
with the existence of a substantial spacetime or a container; if there
is anything like a spacetime quale that seems to be missing in this
example, this is the partial ordering of events—a potential “what it
is like to be spacetime” which must be related somehow to the fun-
damental structure with distinct disordered locality. To repeat, what
is at stake is the puzzlement about how to link the spatio-temporal
with the non-spatio-temporal, being granted that the spatio-temporal
does not have to be linked to a container metaphor, but only with
existence of a particular ordering structure. And, one step further,
arguing that spacetime qualia do not make sense—say, because they
rely on a muddy metaphor—is not enough to silence the deep intuition
that there is something left to explain, a conceptual discrepancy, which
motivates some scholars to refuse to consider seriously the hypothesis
that spacetime might emerge, somehow, from a non spatio-temporal
structure.
In brief, the container metaphor is a bad candidate for grounding
the existence of spacetime qualia. If they exist, those spacetime qualia
are more likely to be identified with a specific structure (say the metric
field in GR, or the ordering of events observed through experience).
Therefore, in what follows, I will assume that there is prima facie
a hard problem of spacetime emergence grounded in the cognitive
dissonance between spatio-temporal and non-spatio-temporal notions.
The expression “prima facie” is here important since it leaves open
that, after careful examination, there is no hard problem of spacetime
emergence in the sense that the apparent cognitive discrepancy may be
cured by some theoretical machinery explaining why this experience
is deceiving. I suspect that this is the view that LW share. As a
result, LW and others might claim that all of this discussion is an
unnecessary detour, when one should simply point out that there is
no hard problem and that one should stop worrying about it.
However, and although I am sympathetic to this possible reaction
to the hard problem, I believe it is missing the overall dialectical con-
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text in which this discussion takes place. Indeed, from my point of
view, Knox, Lam and Wu¨thrich under-estimates the dialectical im-
portance of the cognitive dissonance when it comes to the reticence
of some scholars to seriously consider that spacetime might not exist
fundamentally. Although LW are right to point out that spacetime
qualia would have to differ greatly from the qualia to be found in the
philosophy of mind literature, and that those spacetime qualia would
have to be “more elusive” than qualia, it does not follow from this
that there is no experience of conceptual discrepancy that explains
why so many scholars take as an a priori and necessary constraint
that the world must be fundamentally spatio-temporal. Now, this is
a genuine and a difficult question whether the conceptual discrepancy
associated with spacetime emergence should be explained by the ex-
istence of spacetime qualia, understood as a defining feature of the
spatio-temporal structure that would prevent it to be simply reduced
to features of a non-spatio-temporal structure.
Furthermore, one might argue that the analogy between the two
cases at hands (consciousness and spacetime emergence) breaks down
because facts about qualia cannot, as a matter of principle, be de-
duced from physical facts, when it should be possible to derive GR
from QG.20 As a result, the two cases of consciousness and spacetime
emergence would be disanalogous to some degree. However, as a re-
sponse, note the ambiguity in the claim of derivability of GR from QG.
What it means is that in the quantum gravity context, the aim is to
obtain GR as a mathematical approximation of QG. However, obtain-
ing GR as a mathematical approximation is not enough to relate facts
about the primitive concepts of the two theories, as it would simply
relate structural aspects of the two theories (see Le Bihan and Lin-
nemann 2019). Imagine that we can derive all of the “behaviour” of
matter and energy as described by GR, at relevant scales, from a the-
ory of QG. This behaviour corresponds to the structural facts about
spacetime according to GR. But now we must explain how some GR
structural facts or some GR non-structural facts relate to the theory
of QG. For instance, if we take again the example of disordered local-
ity, explaining the appearance of GR locality (a structural fact) from
this QG distinct structure along statistical procedures will leave open
whether the what is it like to be GR spacetime (its locality structure)
is genuinely explained away by facts about the disordered fundamental
structure. This is not to say that the hard problem of spacetime can-
not be dissolved, but it means that at a superficial level the analogy
holds. And we only need the superficial level for the analogy to hold,
and in order to justify considering seriously the hard problem of space-
20I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
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time emergence. Then only, it is a distinct question whether the hard
problem of spacetime emergence should be answered, or dissolved.21
In order to show that from the difference of profile between space-
time emergence and the mind-body problem, it does not follow that
there is no relevant explanatory gap to be addressed—and therefore
no hard problem of spacetime—I will examine two claims: First, the
claim that the cognitive dissonance with spacetime emergence differs
in nature from the cognitive dissonance to be found in the philoso-
phy of mind; second, the claim that the two situations differ because
of the difference in the degree of cognitive dissonance we experience
when looking at the primitive notions of the spatio-temporal and non-
spatio-temporal theories on the one hand, and the physical and mental
notions in the other hand. As we shall see, those differences are real
but do not justify the claim that there is no cognitive dissonance to
address in the case of spacetime emergence.
Claim 1: The cognitive dissonance with spacetime emergence dif-
fers in nature from the cognitive dissonance to be found in the philoso-
phy of mind. Knox (2014) argued that spacetime qualia would have to
be metaphorical in nature contrary to the qualia associated with con-
sciousness, which are phenomenal entities. Indeed, there is a “what it
is like to have an experience of red”, but no “what it is like to experi-
ence space”— rather what we have in the analogy is a “what it is like
to be space”. Note that the “what it is like to be space” has nothing
to do with phenomenology and merely correspond to consciousness in
the analogy by the fact that it triggers a cognitive dissonance when
we compare the two sets of primitive notions involved in the two com-
pared theories. This is at least true if we focus, not on space, time
or spacetime as we experience them, but rather on spacetime as we
have it in the standard approach to GR. In this second context, it is
right to say that there are no spacetime qualia in the strictest sense
of a “what it is like to experience spacetime”. What we have instead
is a cognitive dissonance that we experience when we compare—at
an intuitive pre-theoretical level—our intuitions about the two sets of
primitive notions of the non-spatio-temporal and the spatio-temporal
theories under consideration.
Consider again for instance disordered locality in the context of
loop quantum gravity: We experience a cognitive dissonance when we
compare the network of spatio-temporal relations associated with a
particular volume of reality at the level of description of GR, with the
21And again, note that even if there is no hard problem of spacetime after careful
consideration of the topic, it remains important to acknowledge the prima facie existence
of a problem in order to address intuitions of scholars who claim that spacetime emergence
is an intrinsically inconsistent idea that should not be seriously considered.
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distinct spin networks or spinfoams, described by LQG. How could
it be that these two networks represent the same part of reality? A
natural move is to answer that the description by GR is merely ap-
proximate and that GR does not capture the richness of the true fun-
damental physical structure of the world. One might then argue that,
as a result, we only need to derive GR from LQG (with mathematical
tools and bridge principles between the primitive notions of LQG and
GR) in order to explain everything there is to explain. However, and
this is the important point, it is not enough to offer this derivation in
order to explain everything there is to explain. An ontological picture
is still lacking and one wants to hear a story about the (non-)existence
of GR spacetime. Should we accept, being granted that there is no GR
spacetime at the fundamental level, that this non-existence propagates
to the derivative level, entailing that GR spacetime is an illusion, a
coarse-grained structure that does not mirror the structure of reality,
or on the contrary that there actually is a GR spacetime that must be
related to the fundamental non-spatio-temporal structure (See Le Bi-
han 2018b)? If the latter, which seems a more promising path22, how
are we to understand the ontological status of the relation between
the two structures?
It is important to note, however, that spacetime qualia would have
to differ, prima facie, in nature from the qualia associated with space-
time emergence. Indeed, the qualia associated with consciousness cap-
ture the specificity of our phenomenological experience when spacetime
qualia would merely describe intuitions we have when we look at con-
cepts. This difference might explain why philosophers of physics have
been inclined to neglect the importance of spacetime qualia. But this
is wrong for two reasons—and each of these two reasons is enough by
itself to show that spacetime qualia deserve to be taken seriously—
meaning that the prima facie explanatory gap should be addressed
in the philosophy of spacetime emergence. The first reason is that
even within the philosophy of mind, it is not clear that qualia must
be explained in terms of the qualitative specificity of our experience,
and not as a specificity or our concepts about consciousness. In fact,
a common strategy for the physicalist—who believes that everything
is physical—is to claim that linguistic descriptions involving qualia do
refer to physical entities and there are no qualia in the world; what
there is, are only qualia concepts in natural languages. This is the
22In Le Bihan (2018b), I defend that the best interpretation of spacetime emergence
is that GR spacetime exists and is constituted by a non-spatio-temporal structure, by
analysing spacetime emergence as a form of spacetime composition. This approach allows
making sense of both the predictive success of GR and of its non-fundamentality, without
committing to a stratified ontology or a metaphysical relation of emergence.
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phenomenal concepts strategy (see e.g. Loar, 1990). The view goes
naturally with the qualia eliminativist tradition; see the seminal ar-
gument of Dennett (1988) and the most recent “illusionist” reboot
of the view by Frankish (2016). A physicalist of this brand may ar-
gue that the specificity of qualia concepts arises from the concepts
themselves—and not from experience itself. Therefore, even in the
philosophy of mind, it might be that the cognitive dissonance we ex-
perience when we look at physical notions and mental notions arise
from a conceptual—rather than experiential—salience.
Here is the second reason to worry about the rejection of spacetime
qualia as an important concept. Let us admit for the sake of argument
that qualitative features apply to entities in the philosophy of mind—
say mental entities numerically distinct from physical entities—when
qualitative features are about concepts or about intuitions about those
concepts in the philosophy of quantum gravity—say about the concept
of metric field in GR and, and the concept of spin networks/foam in
LQG. What it means is that the source of the discrepancy is not
the same. But the fact that the dissonance arises from a different
source does not entail that it is not problematic. It is incorrect to
argue that spacetime qualia should be dismissed because they do not
have the same origin. In brief, the very source of the dissonance
in the philosophy of mind will vary depending on whether one is a
physicalist or a dualist; and, furthermore, there is no reason to require
spacetime qualia to have the same origin as the qualia associated with
consciousness.
Claim 2: The two situations differ because of the difference in the
degree of cognitive dissonance we experience when looking at the two
cases. Indeed, one may argue that the problem is not that spacetime
qualia would have an origin very different from the qualia associated
with consciousness, but rather that they would be more elusive—
because of the smaller explanatory gap. Intuitively, it seems rea-
sonable to assess the explanatory gap between spatio-temporal and
non-spatio-temporal entities (or concepts) as being smaller than the
observed explanatory gap between mental and physical entities (or
concepts). But again, even if we admit that the extent of the gap
is weaker in the case of spacetime emergence, it does not make the
problem disappear. One still has to explain why there is such a gap—
and this would be true even if we conceded that it would not have
the same origin and the same strength as the dissonance experienced
when comparing physical and mental concepts.
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3 Functionalism
3.1 From Consciousness to Spacetime
Functionalism, in the philosophy of mind, aims at solving the mind-
body problem by functionalising mental states, namely identifying
them with functional roles realised by physical states. Functional-
ism aims at explaining the (or some) specific marks of the mental
with respect to physical entities, namely intentionality and phenome-
nal consciousness. As I mentioned above, the strategy is regarded as
successful when it comes to the intentional aspect of mental states.
However, the predominant view in the philosophy of mind is that we
may not functionalise qualia and physicalists rather aim at removing
qualia from our ontological picture of the world, for instance through
the phenomenal concepts strategy (Loar, 1990), or by subscribing to
illusionism (Frankish, 2016).
What matters here is that functionalism is not a singular view and
should be best conceived of as a constellation of distinct positions.
This is not surprising considering the number of different notions of
functions or roles one may think about: biological functions, math-
ematical functions, causal roles, etc.. Importantly for my purpose,
which is to relate functionalism to the hard problem of spacetime,
I will focus on two different parameters defining different sorts of
functionalism. Functionalism is either ontic or linguistic and, sec-
ond, functionalism is either about roles or about realisers (see e.g.
Van Gulick, 2009). In this article, I shall focus on the last two distinc-
tions only because they are the most relevant for the resolution of the
hard problem of spacetime.23 By combining the two criteria, we end
up with three interesting sorts of functionalism about the mind, which,
we shall see in the next sub-section, may be used as models to build
four sorts of spacetime functionalism. Those four sorts of functional-
ism are: analytic functionalism, occupant functionalism, eliminativist
functionalism and role functionalism.
Analytic functionalism, or linguistic functionalism, is the view that
the meanings of mental concepts should be explained in terms of func-
tional concepts. The view is about a piece of language, namely the
vocabularies associated with mental phenomena. As van Gulick puts
it:
According to what one might call “analytical functional-
ism”, mental concepts [...] can be analysed in purely func-
23It might be that the a priori/empirical distinction might play an interesting and
important role in solving the problem of empirical coherence; it would be interesting to
explore this in future works.
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tional terms; that is, the meanings of such concepts can be
explicated in terms of conditions that can themselves be
specified using only functional concepts. In contrast with
ontological functionalists, who assert identities or reduc-
tions among real-world items such as properties, analyt-
ical functionalists assert an identity or reduction among
our ways of describing or thinking about the world [...].
(Van Gulick, 2009, 137)
As explained in this quote, linguistic functionalism contrasts with
more ontologically-loaded species of functionalism. Following a clas-
sical distinction between linguistic predicates and ontological proper-
ties24, this view is not about the meaning of concepts, but about the
existence of properties regarded as building blocks of the non-linguistic
world. According to ontological functionalism, mental properties are
offered a functional analysis, entailing that the very existence of men-
tal properties is tied, one way or another, to the existence of functional
roles.
Now, and this is important for our topic, linguistic and ontological
functionalism are not necessarily exclusive. One might, for instance,
believe that the right way to analyse mental concepts is to run some
linguistic functionalist analysis, and that the best way to account for
this situation, is to accept that linguistic functional roles track onto-
logical functional roles. But it is possible to accept a form of linguistic
functionalism without buying into ontological functionalism. This is
for instance what has been done by logical behaviorists who endorsed
a form of eliminativist functionalism. According to this view, no men-
tal states are lurking behind the functional roles given by a functional
analysis of the behavior of human agents. As Gulick puts it: “They
accept the importance of holistic interdependence in analysing mental-
state concepts but nonetheless regard the truth makers for mental at-
tributions as solely facts about actual and counterfactual behaviour”
(Van Gulick, 2009, 132).
The second important distinction in order to build the relevant
classification of functionalisms for our current goal is between two
kinds of ontological functionalism: ontological role functionalism (role
functionalism for short) and realiser or occupant functionalism (occu-
pant functionalism for short). These two sorts of functionalism are
ontological not in the sense that they accept the objective reality of
functional roles, but in the sense that they both appeal to the notion
of function and say something about the nature of the relation obtain-
ing between mental and physical entities. Actually, as we shall see,
24See e.g. Heil (2003).
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one view—occupant functionalism—does not take ontologically seri-
ously the existence of roles, when the other view—role functionalism—
asserts the existence of functional roles.
Let us start with occupant functionalism. The view was famously
endorsed by Armstrong (1968) and Lewis (1966), and is in the spirit of
the type-type identity theory originally defended by Place (1956), Feigl
(1958) and Smart (1959). According to this approach, mental states
are identical with physical states. Functionalism is, then, only a tool
to articulate the type-type identity theory and explain the apparent
difference between mental states and physical states as a difference in
the way we epistemically access to the physical states. Those different
epistemic accesses to physical states shield us from a straightforward
access to the properties of the entity referred to—examining the prop-
erties of the concept we are using does not suffice to access the prop-
erties of the entity the concept refers to. For instance, we discovered
empirically that pain is identical with a particular neurological state;
it was not possible to discover this fact a priori since the concept of
pain does not include, transparently, descriptions of neurobiological
states. But the property of pain is just this neurobiological property.
Therefore, in this story, there are no mental properties “out there” in
the world, numerically distinct from the physical properties. As Van
Gulick puts it: “[T]he role associated with a given mental kind serves
as a means to secure reference to the relevant property, but it does
not typically give the identity or essence of that property, which must
instead be discovered through empirical investigation.” (Van Gulick,
2009, 137)
What about role functionalism? According to this view, perhaps
the most standard sort of functionalism in the philosophy of mind,
each mental property is identified with the property of playing a par-
ticular role in an encompassing network of functional roles mutually
depending one on each other. Van Gulick presents the view as follows:
The properties of being pain and of playing the pain role
are regarded as one and the same property. If one thinks
instead in terms of properties had by whole persons, such as
that of “being in pain”, the role functionalist would identify
such mental properties with the property of “being in some
state which plays the relevant role”. (Van Gulick, 2009,
136)
In sum, we end up with three ontologically-committed sorts of
functionalism:
• Occupant functionalism, which is the conjunction of analytic
functionalism and an identity theory,
21
• Eliminativist functionalism, which is the conjunction of analytic
functionalism and eliminativism about mental states and,
• Role functionalism, which posits the existence of entities, the
roles, numerically distinct from the occupant of the roles.
This classification is particularly useful to address the hard prob-
lem of consciousness. The three views entail different answers to the
hard problem. Occupant functionalism leads to one of the most pop-
ular forms of physicalism, namely an identity theory. In this story,
mental entities (as individuated by mental concepts) are identical with
physical entities (as individuated by physical or biological concepts).
The functionalist story may then be put to work in order to explain
why we have different sorts of access to these entities.25
Eliminativist functionalism offers a distinct answer to the hard
problem of consciousness: mental states simply do not exist. We may
use a functionalist strategy to refer to physical entities: it remains
that these entities are physical. And since functional roles are merely
terminological constructs, with no ontological shadows, there is not
room for mental entities in this picture.
Finally, role functionalists acknowledge the existence of some enti-
ties, the realisers, tightly related to physical entities, since the mind is
identified with functional roles themselves realised by physical entities.
However, this connection of realisation might be as tight as one wants,
it is not a relation of identity, and role functionalism entails that func-
tional roles are numerically distinct from their realisers. It means that
role functionalism entails the existence of at least two classes of en-
tities: the realisers on the one hand, and the functional roles on the
other hand. Then it is another question whether the functional roles
should be identified with mental entities, entailing property dualism in
its usual sense, or whether functional roles should rather be regarded
as physical entities. The latter option avoids committing to the ex-
istence of mental entities numerically distinct from physical entities.
However, if like me one is a nominalist, one will feel that those en-
tities are dangerously closed to being abstract entities and that their
ontological cost should not be overlooked in one’s general ontological
picture. In brief, role functionalism leads either to a dualist answer
to the hard problem of consciousness since mental properties consti-
tute a collection of entities numerically distinct from the collection
of physical entities, or to a rich physicalist answer to the problem by
positing the existence of ontological roles—which are not ontological
25One might argue that such a form of physicalism should rather be understood as a
form of neutral monism, since the very difference between the mental and the physical is
at the level of the language, and not at the ontological level. See e.g. Stubenberg (2018).
22
free lunches.
3.2 The Limits of Spacetime Functionalism
The situation translates to spacetime emergence with a few caveats.
Here again, we may distinguish between various forms of spacetime
functionalism, corresponding to the various answers to the hard prob-
lem of spacetime emergence. Role functionalists will distinguish be-
tween spacetime roles and the entities implementing these roles, keep-
ing these two collections of entities apart. Occupant functionalists
will use a form of analytic functionalism only to refer in two different
ways to the same collection of entities, entailing a reductionist view
of spacetime. In this picture, we refer to one set of entities under two
different guises: GR and QG. And according to eliminativist func-
tionalism, spacetime roles do not exist—they are merely theoretical
constructs that refer to proper parts of the physical structure, to be
described by a more fundamental theory of quantum gravity.
If role functionalism is the preferred interpretation of spacetime
functionalism, then it comes with the derivative spacetime view. It
entails the falsity of LW’s claims 1. and 2.. First, it is not the case
that spacetime functionalism is orthogonal to the hard problem of
spacetime (as stated with claim 1.) and, second, it is not the case
that spacetime functionalism dissolves the hard problem (as stated by
claim 2.) since role functionalism solves and does not dissolve the hard
problem by grounding the explanatory gap in the existence of onto-
logical roles associated with spacetime which are numerically distinct
from the non-spatio-temporal realisers. Indeed, since the derivative
spacetime view based on role functionalism is an answer to the hard
problem, this position should not be conflated with the claim that
there is no hard problem to begin with. However, it entails the truth of
2*., namely the claim that functionalism may be regarded as a partic-
ular solution to the hard problem of spacetime—the derivative view—
when subscribing to a particular kind of functionalism—namely, role
functionalism.
If one wishes to adopt occupant functionalism instead, then it
comes with spacetime reductionism. It entails the falsity of LW’s
claims 1. and 2.. First, here again it is not the case that space-
time functionalism is orthogonal to the hard problem of spacetime
(as stated with claim 1.) and, second, it is not the case that space-
time functionalism dissolves the hard problem (as stated by claim 2.)
since occupant functionalism solves—and does not dissolve—the hard
problem. Indeed, since spacetime reductionism is an answer to the
hard problem, this position should not be conflated with the claim
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that there is no hard problem to begin with. However, it entails the
truth of 2*., namely the claim that functionalism may be regarded
as a particular solution to the hard problem of spacetime—an iden-
tity theory—when subscribing to a particular kind of functionalism—
namely, occupant functionalism.
And likewise for eliminativist functionalism: it entails the falsity
of claims 1. and 2. since this approach is not orthogonal to the hard
problem. It entails the truth of 2*: functionalism may be regarded as a
particular solution to the hard problem of spacetime—eliminativism—
when subscribing to a particular kind of functionalism—namely, elim-
inativist functionalism.
We may now specify the claim 2* as follows: functionalism may
be regarded as a a particular solution to the hard problem of space-
time when subscribing to role functionalism, occupant functionalism
or eliminativist functionalism. Alternatively, if one does not want to
commit to any specific ontological form of spacetime functionalism,
then one has no other choice than endorsing analytic functionalism.
As a result, this view does not solve or dissolve the hard problem of
spacetime emergence—it simply does not say anything about it. We
may now refine claim 1* as follows: functionalism may be regarded
as a view orthogonal to the hard problem of spacetime when subscrib-
ing to analytic functionalism alone—and not to role functionalism,
occupant functionalism or eliminativist functionalism.
What about the claim 2** that I made in the introduction, namely
the claim that functionalism helps to solve some—but not all—problems
of spacetime emergence? Functionalism, in a non-specified form—as
the disjunction of analytic functionalism alone, analytic functional-
ism plus an identity theory, analytic functionalism plus eliminativism
and ontological functionalism—should be enough to solve the prob-
lem of empirical coherence along the lines suggested by LW since this
issue only requires individuating and relating functional roles in GR
and the world as we ordinarily perceive it to entities posited by the
more fundamental non-spatio-temporal theory—not to take a stance
on what there is. More precisely, the view here is that since analytic
functionalism can easily be associated with a specific ontological view
about what there is (identity view, eliminativism) or be reified into
ontological functionalism, functionalism, as a coarse-grained view, can
solve the problem of empirical coherence with no further mention of
one of the fine-grained species of functionalism. The problem of em-
pirical coherence, if LW are right that functionalism can solve it, could
thereby be solved by remaining neutral with respect to the ontological
problem and the hard problem.
As a conclusion to this section, let us consider a possible objection
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to the general strategy I have been following in the essay—namely,
to offer a fine-grained classification of functionalisms—in order to as-
sess how functionalism can relate to the hard problem of spacetime
emergence. One might perhaps argue that we should not distinguish
between these various sorts of functionalism and that this stipulation
would prevent the very hard problem to appear in the first place. But
what reason would we have to accept this stipulation? Arguably, one
must at the very least provide a justification for this claim that we
should not distinguish between the fine-grained sorts of functionalism.
As long as such a justification remains wanting, and noting that it is
possible on purely a priori grounds to come up with a distinction
between ontic and linguistic roles, such a move appears illegitimate.
4 Conclusion
Functionalism cannot be both orthogonal to the hard problem of
spacetime and make it go away. Any functionalist must either remain
silent about the hard problem or solve it by subscribing to a particu-
lar form of functionalism that entails that spacetime does or does not
exist, namely to a particular solution to the ontological problem. This
clarification should help both friends and foes of spacetime emergence
to articulate their arguments with more care. For instance, a friend
of spacetime emergence willing to answer to the problem of empirical
coherence by appealing to the view that spacetime is derivatively real
(cf. Wu¨thrich, 2017, 298) should be aware that this moves commits
them to a particular answer to the hard problem of spacetime. Or,
alternatively, opponents to spacetime emergence claiming that space-
time must be fundamentally real should be clear on which view on
the hard problem of spacetime, implicitly assumed in the background,
justify their claim—arguably, they must have in mind that a deriva-
tive spacetime view is not a genuine option. Otherwise it is unclear
why they would feel compelled to adopt the view that spacetime must
be fundamentally real to begin with.
Spacetime emergence has been discussed with respect to empirical
issues as the problems of empirical coherence; more metaphysical is-
sues have been put aside. However, philosophers debating spacetime
emergence through the lens of functionalism should adopt a clear view
on the ontological picture they are relying on, if only for the sake of
clarify and consistency of their proposal. They must adopt either one
of the three substantive views—an identity view, a derivative view
or an eliminativist view—or a neutral form of analytic functionalism
which remains completely silent about the ontological implications of
spacetime emergence. Therefore, I urge the friends and foes of space-
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time emergence to focus attention on the hard problem of spacetime
emergence—a novel issue that stands on its own ground and may not
be solved or dissolved just by claiming that spacetime is a functional
structure.
As spacetime functionalism, in its most general form, does not
tell us what spacetime does, the view that “spacetime is as space-
time does” does not tell us what spacetime is. Spacetime might still
be eliminated, reduced to a more fundamental structure or exist in
a non-reductive way by being ontologically implemented by a more
fundamental structure—all these views are consistent with spacetime
functionalism.
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